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RAYMOND MARKEYl

The State of Representative Participation in
Australia: Where to Next?

Abstract: The article first examines the rationale for representative participation, and the circumstances under which it has spread internationally. It then surveys the existing data for representative participation in Australia, and presents
a case for legislation to introduce a generalised system of German-style works
councils. The paper.concludes that the first step towards this end should be the
instigation of a major research agenda to discover more regarding the elements
of historical and contemporary practice which have accounted for success and
failure in representative participation in Australia.

1.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years employee involvement or participation in workplace decision-making has been a major focus of international attention for
researchers, managers and policymakers alike as they seek means for
improving communication. and cooperation between management and
labour. This trend has been the product of broader changes in management practices associated with the· spread of strategic human resource
management, which seeks improved enterprise efficiency in the context
of intensified business competition at a globalleve1.2 The concern with
employee participation has included direct job-oriented employee
involvement through, for example, 'teamwork and quality circles, as well

1
2

Professor Raymond Markey, School of Management, University ofWollongong.
R: Markey, 'Introduction: Global Patterns of Participation', in R. Markey, P.J. Gollan, A.
· Hodgkinson, A. Chouraqrii and U. Veersma (eds.), Models ofEmployee Participation in
a Changing Global Environment: Diversity and Interaction, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001,
pp. 3-22.

The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Volume 20/4, 533-561, 2004.
© Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands.
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as representative forms of participation. The main forms of representative
participation are works councils and employee representatives on boards
of management. These are the focus of. this paper, principally. because
they raise broader questions of governance and policy at a macro leveL
The paper first examines the rationale for representative participa.,.
tion, and the circumstances under which it has spread internationally. It
then surveys the existing data for representative participation in
Australia, and presents a case for legislation to introduce a generalised
system of German-style works councils. The last section of the paper
argues that the first step towards this end should be the instigation of a
major research agenda to discover more regarding the elements of historical and contemporary practice which have accounted for success and
failure in representative participation in Australia.

2.

THE RATIONALE FOR REPRESENTATIVE EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION

The rationale for employee participation and representation in the work.::
place generally is threefold.3 First, a longstanding hitman relatiori.'s tradi~
tion has argued that employees have non-pecuniary needs for creativity,
achievement and social approval. By allowing employees a voice in the
workplace, participation may promote employees' sense of competence,
self-worth and self-actualisation.4 As the workforce becomes more edu~
cated and basic material needs are better satisfied, this perspective has
gained greater. currency.
Secondly, employee participation has been advocated as a ,form •of
power sharing .on the basis of democratic principles.· This is sometimes
referred to as.'industrial citizenship'~Those who advance this argument for
participation comnionly favour the terminology. of 'industrial democracy',
although this has usually not been the preferred terminology of employers. 5
3
4

5

G. Strauss, 'An Overview', in E Heller, E. Pusic, G. Strauss, and B..Wilpert, Organizational Participation. Myth and Reality, Oxford,. Oxford University Press,J998, pp. 8-39.
See B. Wilpert, 'A View from Psychology'; in Heller et al., Organizational
Participation. Myth and Reality, pp. 40-64; J. E. Mathieu and D. Zazac, 'A review and
meta-analysis of the antecedents, correlates and consequences of organizational commitment', Psychological Bulletin, No. 108, 1990, pp. 171-94.
C. Pateman; Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge University Press, New
York, 1970; R. · Dahl, A Preface To Economic Democracy,, Berkeley and Los Angeles,
University of California Press, 1985; J. Rogers, 'United States: Lessons from Abroad and
Home', in J. Rogers and W. Streeck (eds. ), TfOrks Councils. Consultation,· Representation,
and Cooperation in Industrial Relations, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995,
pp. 381-83; W. Streeck, 'Works Councils in Europe: From Consultation to Participation',
in ibid., pp. 321-43; R Wood (ed.), Proceedings of the Internatiqnal Conference on
Industrial Democracy, Adelaide, Sydney, CCH Australia, 1978, pp. 216-49.
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.Qn the left of the political spectrum, 'workers' control' extends industrial democracy to \the polar opposite of managerial prerogative.6 Both of
the hroad rationales described here refer to 'empowerment' of employees
through participation.
Thirdly, the case for employee participation has been based upon the
argument that ·it contributes substantially to organisational efficiency.· An
extensive literature has argued that employee participation has the capac. ity to enhance the quality ofdecision-making by broadening the inputs,
promotes commitment to the outcomes of the decision-making process,
improves motivation, communications and cooperation in the workplace;
may reduce the workload of supervisors, encourages skills development in
the workforce, and can contribute to improved employee/employer relations generally in the workplace.7 These arguments represent a reaction
against Fordist mass production technologies, and their tendency to deskill
employees. Some researchers argue that employee participation·· and
empowerment are progressive management practices which have universal benefits to performance enhancement, as opposed to most other HRM
practices whose success. is contingent upon the organisational context. 8
. Historically, the· main appeal for employee participation has shifted
between the three broad rationales referred to above, reflecting shifts in
economic circumstances and the balance of power between capital and
labour. Humanistic and power-sharing arguments were dominant in the

6

7

8

E. Kardelj, Self-Management •and the Political System, Belgrade, 1980; N. Pasic,
S. Grozdanic and M. Radevic (eds.), Wt:Jrkers' Management in ·Yugoslavia.. Recent
Developments and Trends, Geneva, ILO, 1982; J. Vanek, The General Theory ofLaborManaged Market Economics, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1971.
See M;Aoki, 'Toward an Economic Modd of the Japanese Firm', Journal ofEconomic
Literature, No. 28, 1990, pp .. 1-27; Report and Recommendations ofthe Commission on
the Future of: Worker-Management Relations, (Dunlop Commission). chaired by
J. Dunlop, Washington. DC, US Department of Labor and Department· of Commerce,
1994, Section II; R. B. Freeman, and E. P. Lazear, 'An Economic Analysis of Works
Councils', in Rogers Streeck, Works Council, pp. 27-52; Rogers; 'United States:
Lessons from Abroad and Home', pp. 383-89; Streeck, 'Works Councils in Europe:
From Consultation to Participation', pp. 343-46; J. Meyer, and L. Topolnytsky,
'Building and maintaining employee commitment: implications for HRM policy and
practice', in A. Travaglione and V. Marshall (eds.), Human Resource Strategies: An
Applied Approach, Sydney, McGraw-Hill, 2000, pp. 335-66; R. Markey and J. Monat
(eds.),Innovation and Employee Participation Through Wt:Jrks Councils. International
Case Studies; Aldershot, Avebury, 1997, pp. 6-7, 415-16; K. I. Miller and P. R. Monge,
'Participation, Satisfaction, and Productivity: A Meta-Analytical Review', Academy of
Management Jounial, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1986; pp. 727-53 ..
J.B. Arthur, 'Effects of Human Resource Systems on·Manufacturing·Performance and
Turnover', Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1994, pp: 670-687;
J. T. Delaney and M.A. Huselid; 'The Impact of Human Resource Management Practices
on Perceptions of Organisational Performance', Academy ofManagement Journal, Vol.
39, No: 4, 1996, pp; 949-969. ·
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1960s and 1970s, particularly in the context of worker militancy and economic buoyancy.9 However, organisational efficiency. has provided.the
strongest base for promotion of employee participation since the 1980s.
This shift has occurred in a context of intensified competition in a globalised economic environment, the dominance of economic rationalism in
public policy, and the tipping of the balance of power in favour of
employers, especially as union membership has declined.IO It is notable
that in Germany, where works councils were strengthened by legislation
in 2001, they are attributed with a major share of the responsibility for
the efficiency and competitiveness of German firms.ll
These general rationales for employee involvement apply both to
direct and representative forms: however, representative participation
attracts its own supporting arguments. With the decline of trade union
membership and consequent weakening of unionism as a form of collective representation and employee voice in many countries, the importance
of representative institutions such as works councils has taken on new
significance in recent years, filling, or. potentially filling, .a .collective
'representation gap' in the workplace. Representative participation
through works councils or employee representatives. on boards· also has
become a consideration in the growing international concern with corporate governance which has emerged as a result of a series of major corporate failures since the late 1980s, the most spectacular recent examples
being Enron and WorldCom.
Until recently the corporate governance debate had focused upon
strengthening the position of the shareholders, but these comprise only
one ofthe stakeholders involved:
The specific orientation on shareholders' interests (and shareholder value) carries the risk of a too one-sided focus on- mainly short term - results and the value of the shares. The shareholder model does not allow sufficiently for other interests such
as those of the employees or the environment. A too one-sided

9

10
11

A. Bullock, Report. of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, London,
HMSO, 1977; C. Crouch and A. Pizzorno, The Resurgence of Class Conflict in Western
Europe since 1968, New York, Holmes and Meir, 1978; Wood, Proceedings of the
International Conference.
Markey, 'Introduction: Global Patterns of Participation', pp . .3-22; Strauss, 'An Overview', p. 9.
Eironline (1998/06), 'Report assesses eo-determination and recommends modernisation', eironline (website of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions), <http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/1998/06>.
'
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focus on profitability may adversely affect the attention for the
longer-term policy and the company's future, not to mention the
social responsibility of the company.I2
In his preface ·to the World Bank publication, Corporate Governance:
A Frameworkfor Implementation, Sir Adrian Cadbury recognised a broader range of stakeholders, including employees, customers and community.l3 In the 'stakeholder-model' of corporate governance, the employees'
representatives 'play an active role- as participants- in corporate governance, in the process of strategic, decision-making at corporate level' ,14
With the continuous· process of mergers, take-overs, reorganisations,
downsizing and internationalisation of companies and the growing global
character of business, the issue has assumed growing importance.
In the states of central and eastern Europe the issue of employee participation in corporate governance has had particular salience ·during a
transformation process from centrally-planned to. market economies in
the past decade or more. These states have grappled with the dual issues
of constructing private enterprise firms with a capital base as well as new
industrial relations systems. The two issues often overlapped, with
employees receiving privileged access to company shares and participating in new forms of collective representation through works councils
and/or trade unions, in addition to employee representation on boards of
management. IS

3.

THE INTERNATIONALISATION·OF REPRESENTATIVE PARTICIPATION
PRACTICES

Against this background, the incidence and range of representative participation has expanded substantially. In Germany the works council system

12

R. Goodijk, 'Corporate Governance and Workers' Participation in the Netherlands', in
Markey et al., Models ofEmployee Participation, p. 181.
13 World Bank, Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation, New York, 1999.
14 R. Goodijk, op.•cit., p. 180; also J. Hill, 'Corporate governance and the role of the
employee', in P. J. Gollan and G. Patmore (eds.), Partnership at work:.The challenge of
employee democracy. Labor Essays 2003, Sydney, Pluto Press, 2003, pp. 110-121.
15 C. Kollonay-Lehoczky, 'The emergence of new forms of workers' participation in central
and eastern European countries', in Markey and Monat, Innovation and Employee
Participation. Through . Works. Councils, pp., .169-89; K. Konecki, and. J. Kulpiiiska,
'Employee participation in privatised and private firm: the Polish experience', in Markey
. and Monat, Innovation and Employee Participation Through Works Councils, pp. 231-42;
B. Kavcic, ·'Slovenia: from self-management to eo-determination'; in Markey and Monat,
Innovation and Employee Participation Through TfOrks Councils, pp. 210-30. ,
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

WINTER2004

538

was extended by reform legislation of June 2001 ,16 From the mid-1990s
multinational European Works Councils (EWCs) have slowly .begun to
establish themselves in the European Union (EU) and European Economic
Area (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway in addition to the EU countries)
as a result of the 1994 EWC Directive of the EU. Of more than:1800 multinational companies estimated to be affected by the EWC. Directive, 639
have concluded agreements for establishing EWCs, .negotiations in a further 150 were still underway in 2003, and a further 40 voluntary EWC
agreements had been reached prior to. the 1994 Directive)?. Since the
implementation of the Directive greater. numbers of companies have been
brought under. its purview. by the enlargement of the. EU •to 25 ·member
states (note the impact in central and eastern Europe already). IS. Coverage
also expanded when Britain acceded to the Directive at the end of 1997 ~ ·
· Two further measures of the EU provide support for EWCs and other
forms ofrepresentative·participation. Late in 2001 a European Company
Statute was adopted, to provide companies with the option of forming a
European Company...,.. 'Societas Europeae'. (SE). These are able to function on a European-wide basis governed by EUJaw, which· facilitates
mergers and multinational.operations under a uniform set of rules for
management .and reporting. systems. The creation of a European
Company requires negotiations for employee participation:with a body,
such as a works council or trade union, representing all employees in the
companies involved. Failing agreement, a standard set of. principles
require regular reporting to and consultation with a body representing
employees, concerning business plans, production and sales levels,
restructuring and retrenchments.19 This was followed early in 2002 by the

/!

16 . Eiron1ine, 'Reform of Works Constitution Act proposed', Eir~nline, 'Government adopts
draft bill on reform of Works Constitution Act', Eironline, <http:// ww\V.eiro.eurofound.ie/2001/02>; Eironline, 'Government adopts draft bill on reform of Works
Constitution Act', eironline, http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2001/03; eironline, ·'Works
Constitution Act reform adopted', Eironline, <http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/ 2001/07>.
17 J. Waddington and P. Kerckhofs, 'European Works Councils: what is the current state of
play?', Transfer. European Review of Labour and Research, Vol. 9, ·No.· 2, Summer
2003; pp. 324-25; H. Platzer, S. Riib and K. Weiner, 'European Works Couricils- Article
6 agreements: quantitative and qualitative developments', Transfer, Vol. ·7, No. 1,
Spring, 2001, pp. 90-94; P. Cressey, 'Transnational works councils and macro European
developments', in Markey and Monat, Innovation and Employee Participation Through
TfOrks Councils, pp. 37-38.
·
18 H; Kohl and H. Platzer, 'Labour relations in central and eastern· Europe and the
European social model', Transfer, Spring 2003, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 11-30.··
19 Europa, 'The European Company- Frequently Asked Questions', Europa, <http://
europa.eu.int/comm/internal/en/company/company/news/01-314>,· 2001; K.. O'Kelly,
'The European Company Statute', paper ·presented to Workers' ·Participation· Study
Group, International Industrial Relations Association European Congress, Oslo, 2001.
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Information and Consultation Directive, that obliges all businesses with
over 50 employees to implement genuine.consultation of their employees
prior to all major decisions, particularly.ifthey affectjobs:Later that year
a draft Directive on information and consultation in relation to company
takeovers was also adopted.2o
It" is important to note that multinationals based outside the EU, in
Japan and the USA; .for example, are subject to the EWC Directive for
their EU operations.: Indeed, a quarter of multinationals covered by the
Directive are based outside the EU, and of these 61 per cent are based in
the US, i.e. 15 per cent of all multinationals affected.2L Similarly, even
before Britain was· covered by the· EWC •Directive, many British-based
firms were subject to it for their continental European operations, so long
as. they. fulfilled the relevant threshold criteria: over 1,000 employees· in
the EU, and establishments employing 150 employees in at least two EU
countries (outside the UK) The Trades Union Congress estimated in 1994
that. 102 British firms were. affected in this .way. For this reason some
British and overseas-based firms with obligations to form EWCs based
on continental European operations extended coverage to British workers
anyway,·because to exclude them from an existing structure would be discriminatory.22 It seems that a similar rationale may now be taking effect
with firms subject to the EWC Directive, but also employing substantial
workforces outside the EU. At least two major multinationals- SKF (the
Swedish-based ball-bearing manufacturer) and Volkswagen - have
extended their EWCs into World .Works Councils (WWCs) covering
employees in Asia, South Africa and South America.23 These are based
upon voluntary agreements with relevant unions, rather. than .any ·legal
obligation, with the International Metalworkers' Federation playing a
major initiating role. ·Based on the EWC model, an employer representa.:.
tive at the 4th Regional Asian International Industrial Relations
Association Congress in Manila in November 2001 called for the estab-

20

Europa, 'New Worker Information and Consultation Directive a 'modern business tool',
says Commission', Europa, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/
2002/jan/0 11_en>; Eironline 'Final approval given to consultation Directive', Eironline,
<http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2002/04>.
Eironline,. 'Commission makes new proposal for takeovers Directive', Eironline,
<http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2002/011>.
21 · Waddington and Kerckhofs, ·'European Works,Councils: whaUs the current state of
·.play?', pp. 325-26. .
22 Cressey, 'Transnational works councils and macro European developments', pp. 38-39.
23 R. Steiert, .'European Works Councils, World Works Councils and the liaison role of the
trade unions: a test of international union policy', Transfer, Vol. 7, No. 1; Spring, 2001,
pp. 114-31.
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lishment of Asian Works Councils. The increased momentum of market
(including labour market) globalisation and international mergers in
recent years provides considerable incentive for the globalisation, of
participative and consultative practices, especially. from the employees'
perspective.
The recent European experience built on strong foundations. Prior to
the EWCs, most EU countries, and;a number outside the EU, had wellestablished systems of works councils, through which employee representatives are informed or consulted on management decisions, or even
participate in decision-making (codetermination). These workplace representative organs have mainly been introduced by legislation, which
varies considerably between countries. The most substantial instances, in
terms of consultative and . codetermination rights, have been in
Scandinavia and Germany. The Swedish model is based on workplace
trade union clubs as the basis of workplace participation and consultation, whereas the German model is based upon statutory works councils
with defined powers and roles separate from those of trade unions. Twothirds of EU member states, and a number of European countries outside
the EU, also have statutory board-level representation for employees. As
with works councils, these structures vary considerably in terms of the
size threshold of companies, level of employee representation; or even
the sector in which they apply. In the 'Rhineland' countries (Germany,
Austria, the Netherlands) and Denmark, companies operate with a dual
structure of supervisory and management boards, and on the German
supervisory boards there is full parity representation.24
This European model of representative participation, in its various
forms, has underlain the EU-wide developments of recent years. As we
have seen, its influence is also reaching beyond Europe. What is its relevance for Australia?

24

H. Knudsen, Employee Participation in Europe, London, Sage, 1995, chs. 2, 4, 5 and 6;
Rogers and Streeck, TfOrks Councils, various contributions; P. Auer, •eo-determination
in Germany: Institutional Stability in a Changing Environment', in E. David and R.
Lansbury (eds.), Managing Together. Consultation and Participation in the TfOrkplace,
Melbourne, Longman, 1996, pp. 160-72; C. Berggren, 'Sweden: A Fragile but still
Innovative System', in ibid., pp. 193-207; R. Blanpain, 'Management Initiatives and
Rights to Information, Consultation and Workers' Participation in the EC Countries',
BCLR, No. 27, 1993, pp. 25-41.
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AUSTRALIAN REPRESENTATIVE PARTICIPATION AT THE WORKPLACE

As with other English-speaking countries such as the US and UK,
Australian representative employee participation other than through trade
. unions has been less substantially institutionalised than in western
Europe. In Australia and the English-speaking countries generally, no
legislation exists for works councils or employee representatives on
boards. Joint consultative committees (JCCs) are the nearest equivalent
to works councils, and the most common form of representative employee participation, but employee representation on boards also occurs in
some firms.2s
4.1. Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs)

JCCs differ from statutory works councils in that they are usually the
product of unilateral management initiative or of union/management
agreement. They also .vary considerably in terms of composition, jurisdiction, powers and organisational level of operation. They commonly
include up to 50 per cent managers, as well as employee representatives.
The latter are ,sometimes ·appointed by management, sometimes by
unions or a combination of the two, and seem to be less commonly elected directly by employees. JCCs usually have a purely advisory role to
management, are often restricted in their jurisdiction to a narrow range of
issues, and often have specific briefs for a limited period of time (task
forces).26 British data shows a similar pattem,27
JCCs received encouragement in Australia from the restructuring
and structural· efficiency guidelines· adopted by the Australian· Industrial
Relations Commissionjn 1988/9. From 1990 to 1995 the proportion of

25

26
27

For the USA, see G. Strauss, 'American Experience with Union-Nominated Boards of
Directors', in Markey et al. Models ofEmployee Participation, pp: 97-118; T. Donahue,
'Emerging models of employee participation and representation in the US', in Markey
and Monat, Innovation and Employee Participation Through Works Councils, pp. 27279; G. Strauss, 'Participation in the United States: progress and barriers', in Davis and
Lansbury, Managing Together, pp.l73-92; Dunlop Commission 1994. For the UK, see
Knudsen, Employee Participation in Europe, eh. 3; M. Marchington, 'Employee
Involvement in Britain: Voluntarisin and Diversity', in Davis and Lansbury, Managing
Together, pp. 227-240; N. Millward, A. Bryson, and· J. Forth, All Change at Work?
British Employment Relations 1980-1998, as portrayed by the Workplace Industrial
Relations Survey series, London, Routledge, 2000, pp. 108-3 7.
Strauss, 'An Overview', pp. 28-9; R: Markey and J. Monat, 'Introduction2, in Markey
and Monat, Innovation and Employee ParticipationThrough Works Councils, pp. 1-26.
Millward et al., All Change at Work?, pp. 111-12; M. Terry, 'Systems of collective
employee representation in non-union firms in the UK', IRJ, Vol. 30, No. 1, March
1999, pp. 16-30.
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workplaces with 20 or more employees that had standingjoint consultative committees more than doubled, from 14 to 33 per cent. They are
much more· common in public-sector, large and unionised workplaces. 28
Similar trends have occurred. in the UK, except there the incidence .of
JCCs has actually declined since the·1980s; from ..J4 per cent of workplaces in 1984 to 29 per cent in 1990 and 1998.'Survey evidence from the
UK also indicates that many JCCs are 'not enduring institutions of
employee representation' ,29 · , ..
In comparison. with works councils, JCCs suffer a number. oflimitations as a form of genuine employee representation or. voice. To the extent
that they rely on management discretion in their formation, structure and
powers, their limitations are clear. Where they rely on agreement with
unions, their viability as a general representative approach to employee
voice is also severely constrained in Australia (and the UK and US) by
the declining level of union coverage and the fact that a majority of
employees and workplaces are not unionised.· In instigating JCCs, data
from the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS)
shows that Australian managers were motivated mainly by the desire to
improve communication, improve efficiency or product quality and
implement change, much more so than a. desire to increase job satisfaction or employee morale. This data also confirms that Australian JCCs
have a relatively narrow range of issues over which they enjoyjurisdiction, although.the important issue of work organisation is that most commonly dealt with.JO The inclusion of maiiagement representatives on
JCCS also potentially limits their independence as an expression of
employee .voice.
Survey data regarding the effectiveness of JCCs is largely positive in
terms of achieving management objectives, notably improved efficiency
and communication and facilitation of organisational change.3I However,
this data should be treated with great caution. As Palmer and McGraw
note:

A. Morehead, M. Steele, M. Alexander, K. Stephen, and L. Duffin, Changes at Work. The
1995Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, Melbourne, Longman, 1997, pp.
188-89; E. Davis and R. Lansbury, 'Consultation. and Employee Participation in
Australian Workplaces: 1986-95', in Davis and Lansbury, Managing Together, pp. 1-24.
29 Millward et al., All Change at Work?, p. 110.
30 Morehead et al., Changes at Work, pp. 190-5. ;
31 ·For example, Morehead et al., Changes at Work, p. 195; S. Fernie, and D. Metcalf,
'Participation, contingent pay, representation and .workplace performance: .evidence
from Great Britain', BJJR, Vol. 33, No. 3, September 1995, pp. 397-98.

28
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It may well be the case that whilst managers are usually less rep-

resented than non-managers on JCCsthey may nevertheless take ·
an active role . in structuring the discussion and the recommendations .which are made. Little can also .be said concerning
whether the discussion is simply information sharing on the part
of management or whether it involves meaningful consultation.
Thus, it is questionable whether· employees are empowered .. ; .
simply through their ability to discuss a number of issues rele- ·
vant to · the core .· business .and operational functions of their
· organisation.32
Palmer and McGraw also note.the significance of the fact that HR managers are the.usual survey·source of data concerning the effectiveness of
JCCs. Surveys based on employee views of the effectiveness of JCCs
may produce quite different results.
·The trends from, surveys were·corroborated by.Mitchell et af.'33 in a
detailed examination of enterprise .flexibility agreements and certified
agreements ratified by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in
1994/5. They were interested in the impact of sections of the Common-:wealth1ndustrial Relations Reform Act 1993, which sought to encourage
employee involvement in decision-making at the workplace level. The
Act required as a pre-condition for certification of enterprise agreements
that they establish a process for consultation over .'changes to the organ:.
isation or performance. ofwork'. JCCs were the .most common response
to .this requirement in agreements (62. per. cent of certified agreements,
and 59. per cent of enterprise. flexibility agreements). However, the vast
majority of these agreements:(75:per cent and.64 per cent respectively)
failed.to specifyia fixed frequency.ofJCC meetings, and:most did not
even refer• to the frequency of meetings (64· per cent and 56 per cent
respectively). In addition,: 60 per cent of all:agreements failed to provide
for the constitution. of the JCC; and in a majority ofthose which made
these.provisions the means for appointing the JCC members was not indicated. These results demonstrate a low commitment to!the.operation·of
JCCs and ensuring their representativeness.··Mitchell·et ·al. further· noted
a relatively narrow range of issues falling within the jurisdiction of these

<·

32

33

I. Palmer. and .P. McGraw, 'A New Era for. Joint Consultation? Human Resource
Managers' Perceptions of JCCs and Enterprise Bargaining', in D. Mortimer, P. Leece
and R; Morris (eds.), Workplace Reform and Enterprise Bargaining, Sydney, Harcourt
Brace, 1996, p. 182.
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committees. They concluded that the legislation failed to strengthen
employee involvement in' decision~making; mainly because the AIRC did
not implement the letter or spirit of the law in this area. ,
The Commonwealth Workplace Relations Act 1996 superseded the
1993 legislation, but has done little effectively to encourage JCCs or
other forms of employee involvement. The Act provides for nori-union
enterprise agreements, which may offer opportunities for non-union
forms of employee representation. However, . these continue to account
for only a small proportion of agreements certified, and in the absence of
detailed studies, there is little reason to suppose that where JCCs have
been formed that they are any more effective than indicated in previous
enterprise flexibility agreements. Mitchell and Fetter have also found that
Australian Workplace Agreements mandated by the .1996 Act rarely refer
to JCCs,34 or even more generally to consultation and information-sharing, notwithstanding their frequent association with High Performance
Work Systems (or High Involvement or High Commitment Workplaces),
which emphasise cooperation and consultation with employees. Gollan's
subsequent study of AWAs indicated thatJCCs were often part of the
process leading to implementation of AWAs, and that 'employers who
made use of JCCs or works committees were significantly more likely to
have had an improvement in labour productivity' ,35 The two greatest benefits from JCCs according to these employers were improvements in
implementation of change and labour productivity, with managementemployee relations third, and employee commitment equal fourth with
quality. This ranking of objectives and outcomes is similar to the AWIRS
95 results discussed earlier, and Palmer and McGraw's observations on
the reliability of such data remain. apposite here; it reflects managerial
priorities; relies on managers' perceptions of effectiveness and does not
necessarily indicate effective employee voice or empowerment.
The available evidence from a· small number of more detailed case
studies further confirms the limitations of JCCs, where they exist.
Buchanan investigated 19 enterprises in the metals and allied industries
for which in-depth documentation of consultative practices was introduced as· part of the Australian Best Practice Demonstration Program of
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1991-96. He concluded that actual implementation of consultative
arrangements 'was patchy and often transient', that they 'lacked autonomy from management', and were associated with 'sidelining of union
representation' as well as work intensification, enhanced managerial control and extension of non-standard forms of employment.36 McGraw and
Palmer's case study research into the establishment of JCCs as part of the
enterprise bargaining process demonstrated that many are confined by
management to trivial issues, which they characterise as the three T's: tea,
towels and toilets.37 Furthermore, they argued that many are short-lived,
and they leave many. issues unresolved because of inadequate provision
of resources to implement recommendations and inadequate training to
facilitate effective participation. Other case studies , confirm that
Australian JCCs are almost. exclusively advisory, rather than enjoying
substantial eo-decision-making powers.38
4.2. Employee Representatives on Boards (ERBs)

We also may elicit some idea of the incidence ofERB in the 1990s from
the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys of 1990 and 1995
(AWIRS 90 and 95). However, these surveys are based on workplaces
with 20 or more employees, rather than organisations, which limits the
inference of general conclusions.
AWIRS 90 found that only? per cent of all workplaces surveyed had
ERB.39 Five years later this had grown to 13 per cent.40 No significant
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correlation was found between· ERB and union presence or size of the
workplace. However, there were significance levels of 99 per cent for
correlations between ERB and public/private•sector and industry.
One in five public-sector workplaces had ERB, twice as likely as in
the private· sector.. The industries· where ERB ·occurred most frequently
were Education (54,per cent), Health and Community Services (23 per
cent) and Communication Services. (20 per cent), . although. not
Government Administration (7 per cent): These industries are all dominated by public-sector agencies. Government Administration workplaces
normally come under the control of public-service departments which are
not governed by a board structure, but are directly responsible to
Ministers. Health . and Community Services and .Communication
Services, on the other. hand, are characterised more by. statutory authorities or corporations which are governed. by boards: e.g. Area Health
Services and Australia Post. Education is more mixed, since it includes
universities, which are clearly statutory authorities 'governed by boards
(called councils), but also schools and TAFE vocational education col:.
leges which have boards but do not enjoy the full autonomy of a statutory authority. Strictly speaking, these do not count as examples of employee representation on corporate boards of management in the sense that
has been discussed here. Their exclusion would significantly reduce the
incidence of ERB for the public sector. :
·
Public-sector influences also accounted for Cultural and Recreational
Services scoring relatively highly with ERB frequency (13 per cent). In
the sub-section for Libraries, Museums and the Arts, ERB occurred in 23
per cent of cases. The relatively high incidence of ERB in the private sector d~minated industries of Property and Business Services (15 per cent),
Wholesale Trade (13 per cerit), and Construction (11. per cent) is less easy
to explain, but otherwise these trends are not unexpected.
Australian governments have instigated ERBs for statutory authorities and corporations from at least the 1950s,, particularly at the State
governinent level. In 1952 a trade-union representative was included on
the board of the newly established NSW Electricity Commission. Other
State electricity authorities followedsuifover the next few years, and in
NSW the State Dockyard and the railways also included ERBs, as did the
State Superannuation Board.41 From the 1970s this became more common. State ALP governments did this as a matter of policy, led· by the
South Australian ALP government of the .1970~ .• At the federal level
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ERBs also appeared on statutory authorities such as the ABC, Australia
Post, QANTAS and the Reserve Bank, particularly under the federal ALP
government from 1983-96. ·In the last two of these instances, however,
this was the result of appointment of a union official to a board vacancy,
rather then the creation of a board position specifically for an employee
representative.
! Although we lack detailed research in this area, it is likely that the
degree of public-sector ERB · has declined in recent years as a. result of
political' choice ·and· the process of coporatisation and ·privatisation· of
many public"sector agencies. For example, in NSW the corporatisation of
the TAB led to a board restructuring which lost employee representatives
in the process. This occurred in a number of cases in Victoria. under, the
Kennett Liberal government during the 1990s; At the federal level similar processes. have seen the loss of an employee representative on the
QANTAS board. , Some· of this loss of, public-sector ERBs is also the
result of political choice, in the case of the Victorian Kennett government
and the post 1996 federal Liberal/National government. The Reserve
Bank, for example, no longer has an ERB. This case is an indication of
how brittle the practice is when it relies on the ad hoc good grace of government, rather than structured positions.~

5.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR AUSTRALIA

The limited incidence of employee representation on boards in Australia,
and the major limitations in the structure and operations of JCCs, indicate
the need to consider the introduction of more substantial forms of representative employee·participation as a means of building workplace cooperation· and commitment.42 ·In the light· of recent corporate collapses· in
Australia; such as HIH,. One. Tel and Ansett, with' the ensuing loss ·of or
threat to workers' entitlements, it seems a particularly apposite moment to
examine forms of corporate governance which both recognise employees
as legitimate stakeholders and potentially provide an internal corporate
means of monitoring the activities ofboards of directors and management.
The 'representation gap' in Australia is~ also extensive, with~ the major
decline in the level ofunionisation in Australia to 23 per cent, and as lit-'
tie as 18 per cent in the private sector;43 a majority ofworkplaces have no

42 · P.J. Gollan and R. Markey, 'Conclusions: Models of Diversity and· Interaction', in
·'
Markey et al., Models of Employee Participation, pp. 322-43 ..·..
43 . Australian Bureau of Statistics, Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union
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effective employee voice. To date this gap has not been effectively filled
by other means, and it is not likely to be filled in the near future.
For these reasons it is noticeable that recent commentators already
have looked towards other means, such as European-style works councils
to fill the growing void in collective labour institutions in Australia.44
Works councils allow greater opportunities for employee voice than
employee· representatives on boards, and they· have substantial foundations, in the existing JCCs, upon which to build. ERBs in themselves also
have major limitations in terms of their powers, their knowledge ·base,
restrictions of confidentiality; communications difficulties with employees, and role conflicts. They function· best in association with other forms
of participation, such as works councils. However, ERBs may be an
effective support mechanism for works councils, as is the case in the
German codetermination system. It is possible to identify substantial
advantages for both employers and employees from a generalised works
council system in the Australian context. Under these circumstances, the
support for works· councils is potentially widespread.
It is notable that eightAustralian companies are covered already by
the EWC ·Directive for their EU operations.45 These include: Amcor,
Australian National Industries Lt&, Boral, Burns Philp, Ma)rne Nickless,
National Australia Group, Pioneer International Ltd., and TNT. Other
US, Japanese, British or European multinationals operating in Australia
undoubtedly have EWCs in the EU. This provides a substantial base from
which Australian unions might negotiate works council structures, and/or
inclusion in a WWC. It also means that these companies would be familiar with the impact of legislation to implement a .works council system.
The most effective way in which a generalised·system of works councils
could be developed in Australia would be· through· legislation. Without
legislation which defines and guarantees their powers and composition,
works councils may. not be secure from managerial or union encroachments upon their independence, or at least may not appear to be, which
would reduce the degree of trust between the participants, and hence, the
effectiveness of the works councils. Legislation would ensure that all
works councils have the same opportunities and constraints. Apart from
its role in pushing sometimes reluctant management or unions towards a
cooperative, consultative relationship at the workplace, a statutory system has an important role to play in ensuring the neutrality of participa-
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tive structures, free from the impositions of whichever party is favoured
by the balance of industrial power.46
The German model of. works councils seems the most likely to
achieve these ends. It is an extensive system which guarantees specific
structures and rights for the works councils. The decline in union membership means that the Swedish system of employee participation, based
entirely upon unions, is inappropriate for Australian circumstances. Most
importantly, the German system maintains the integrity of works councils
separate from both employers and unions, thus generating a high degree
of trust on both sides.47 It would require national legislation, preferably
with mirror state legislation given the significant 'residual' industrial
powers of the states. A number of recent commentators have indicated the
practical constitutional possibilities for national legislation implementing
representative employee participation, particularly through works councils.48
A German-style. system ofworks councils would have a number of
advantages in the Australian context. In the first instance,. it would further
the public policy objective of decentralisation of industrial relations processes to the enterprise level to maximise flexibility and efficiency. This· has
been the consensus·public policy approach since 1988, even if it has taken
somewhat different forms under Labor and Liberal/National governments.
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Secondly, there are advantages in separating the negotiation of workplace change from unions and placing the main responsibility for it under
the works councils in a German-style system. This means that the employee representatives who are most directly affected and who have the most
direct experience of conditions in a particular workplace become involved
in the decision-making process.
The German system also maximises employee job security in the
process of workplace change and the achievement of flexibility' in the
workplace. In the current Australian industrial relations system the negotiation of. organisational change faces a relatively high degree of resistance from employees and their union representatives according to survey
data. A major reason for this has been. the association of workplace
change with job loss.49 However, under the German system the works
council has some of its most extensive rights for consultation in relation
to job loss as a result of restructuring, as we have seen. In this context,
the process of codetermination .is much more likely to alleviate job loss
and to bring employees to an acceptance ofrestructuring.
Similarly, · the German works council·. system separates ·bargaining
over wages from the process of workplace change and the achievement
of flexibility in the workplace. Organisational change has ·considerable
potential to affect wage rates as a result of reclassification of grades of
jobs, changes to skill requirements or the skills mix in the workforce, and
changes to the productivity, pace and intensity of labour. For these reasons negotiation of organisational change is often closely associated with
expectations over wage rates from both sides, particularly in the contemporary Australian institutional context where enterprise bargaining is the
main determinant of wages and other conditions. However, whilst the
German works councils may negotiate bonuses, shift allowances, and the
skills mix of the workforce, general wage rates are negotiated at an industry level by the unions. Consequently, general wage rates are removed
from the consideration of flexibility and change at the individual workpface. This simultaneously removes a major impediment to the successful negotiation of change and allows both management and works council to focus on more efficient work organisation itsel[
·
In these ways the German works council system would offer mutual
advantages to employers and employees in the Australian context.
Employers would not compete on the basis of wage costs, but on the basis
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of achievement of genuine efficiencies in the workplace through.workplace change. Employees would have less to fear from organisational
change and the development of greater workplace efficiency if it was not
so closely associated with job loss or variations in wages. Because of this,
they would be less likely to be resistant to change.
More generally, Australian employers could benefit from a works
council system in a number of ways. The extension of employee voice in
the decision-making process, often where none exists at all, extends the
range of expertise informing decision-making. It also fosters employee
cooperation and commitment to the outcomes of decision-making in the
workplace. Most importantly, a works council system would encourage a
consensual; integrative approach to important aspects ofworkplace negotiations, such as flexibility, and individual employee cases, which otherwise are likely to be resolved through a more adversarial system involving unions.
Participation begets participation: a large body of international survey
and case study evidence now strongly indicates that the successful implementation of direct forms of participation,. such· as teamwork, quality circles and Total. Quality· Management programs, are facilitated by systems
of representative participation such as works councils. so Theoretical
explanations of the role of direct participative mechanisms of this kind in
promoting efficiency and· innovative work patterns have •been supported
by a range of empirical data, such as the recent Employee Participation in
Organisational Change·(EPOC) survey of European Union countries.sl
AWIRS also revealed that Australian employers were adopting directparticipative practices at a high rate; with almost half of workplaces surveyed
practicing team building and well over a third implementing semi or fully
autonomous work groups and total quality management. These managers
claimed that workplace performance improved in 84 per cent of cases, that
product or service quality improved in 82 per cent of cases, that communication between managers and employers improved in 75 per cent of
cases, and that the ease with which change was introduced improved in 73
per cent of cases where direct participative practices were employed. The
same survey revealed a strong correlation between representative forms of
participation- mainly JCCs- and unionisation in workplaces where direct
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participation had been implemented.52 Gollan's study. of AWAs in
Australia indicated similar positive correlations between collective JCCs
and direct forms ofparticipation.53
The EPOC survey also showed a strong complementarity between the
success of direct participative practices and the incidence of representative
participation,·predominantly works councils. EPOC demonstrated
the importance of employee and employee representative involvement in the regulation of direct participation in order to improve
both the quality of the participation itself and its economic and
. social effects. Far from being a barrier to progress, it seems,
employee representatives are agents of change. The greater their
involvement, in terms both of form and extent.(and this applies
particularly to negotiation and joint decision-making), the more
the indicators of the effects were positive.54
Australian employers, therefore, could expect to benefit in. the implementation of team work and other forms of direct employee participation
designed to improve efficiency and quality, through the introduction of a
more systematic and extensive form of workplace representative participation, such as works councils.
In the German case, the unions initially. opposed the introduction of
works councils, which were partly motivated by the desire to provide an
alternative form.of employee voice more tied to the interests of the enterprise. Australian unions, and their counterparts in other English-speaking
countries, have traditionally been deeply suspicious of representative
forms of employee participation along these lines. The concern is that
they will effectively undermine union loyalty in the workplace by providing an alternative voice for employees, even if they are not designed
with such an objective in mind. This problem would become exacerbated
for: unions and employees if works ·cotincils became incorporated· into
management,, which is precisely what unions have feared especially
because of the relative power and resource imbalance between an
employer and· employees in an enterprise.55 In the US this fear focused
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upon the potential for company.unions which employers used to undercut genuine employee organisations in the 1920s, and as •a .result the
National· Labour. Relations Act ·of 193 5 effectively· bans any. company
representative bodies.s6 In addition, unions· have traditionally been.concemed with the prospects for 'workplace egoism', whereby employees in
particular workplaces may be supportive· of enterprise initiatives· which
undercut broader industry policies of unions, because of atypically negative or positive performance of their own particular enterprise. For example, a firm undergoing financial or market difficulties may be able to persuade employees that it is in their interest to accept flexible: approaches
to industry standards regarding lower wages or extra hours, which would
have the effect of applying .competitive pressure to other .firms in the
industry to follow· suit. 57
However, notwithstanding these potentially. negative impacts, unions
generally are likely to benefit from a works council system with the appro.,.
priate checks and balances. As noted earlier the vast majority of works
councilors in· Germany, and most other European countries where they
exist, are union members, even though only a minority of the workforce is
unionised. Union activists are,.by definition, likely to be more industrially active and visible in the workplace, to have objectives which they wish
to pursue, and to network more effectively than non-unionists. This means
that in practice unions may have an indirect influence on works councils.
The German and European· experience· generally also suggests that
works councils· commonly work in partnership with unions, especially in
sharing of data. In particular, .the unions can provide the councils with
research datarelating to the industry and economy as a whole; nationally and internationally, which works councilors would.not ·otherwise be
able to·access easily. Unions also have the networking capability to link
work· councilors from·· different firms. so that they. can share data. and
experiences. ss In these ways unions can actually reach a wider proportion
of the workforce than just union members; and the relationship may even
assistunionsin recruitment of members. For all of these reasons German
::.,''
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unions ·are now fully supportive of works councils. Australian unions
could also benefit from them in the same ways.
The potential ·benefits 'of a works council system for Australian
unions were recognised in 1995 by the Evatt Foundation report, Unions
2001. A Blueprint for Trade Union Activism. It noted the. way in which
German works· councils ·collaborate effectively with unions, providing
unions with a tWo-way communication channel linking them with the
shopfloor or office, a strong organisational base which partially overcomes the freerider issue, and strengthens. union claims to speak for
workers as a whole even if union membership accounts for a minority of
the workfcirce. The authors of the report saw works councils as a major
contributor to an 'articulated' union movementwith strong central organisations as well as the capacity to intervene in enterprise decision-making. The potential for conflicting-loyalties-to undermine union authority
and produce a 'union-substitution effect' was considered to have little if
any impact in Germany. However, the authors also noted some dangers to
unions where the unions were divided on ideologicaLlines and competed
for members, as in the Netherlands.and France. Here, because the works
councils can become extensions of this uriion competition, the articulated
representation of employee interests does not effectively ·emerge, and
unions may be weakened by works councils59 Nevertheless, this potential
weakness generally does not apply to Australia because of its more centralised structure of unionism. Consequently, the authors recommended
the. establishment of a union commission of inquiry to review the advantages and disadvantages of various models of works councils to develop
an appropriate model for Australian conditions, but no action has ever
been taken in this direction.
The manner in which the division of powers and·authority is structured between German works councils and unions. may also provide
wider benefits to unions and employees. Whilst· works councils have
autonomy over non-wage issues in the workplace, general standards and
wage rates are regulated by industry-level collective bargaining. This
means that whilst the works councils maximise flexibility at the workplace level, there is also a high degree of centralised determination of
wages and standard conditions such as working hours. In the Australian
context this would imply a strengthening of the award system, without
necessarily reducing enterprise flexibility. One instance of how this could
operate successfully in achieving ·dual objectives is provided by the
implementation of reduced working hours in Germany during the.1980s.
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The hours reduction was negotiated on an industry level, on the basis of
a standard 37.5 hour week, or 35 hours in the metals industry. However,
it was left to the works. councils to negotiate at enterprise level the implementation of this. standard, and a variety of approaches were adopted .
. These included a daily reduction in hours, a four-and-a-half day week, a
nine-day fortnight, and longer annualleave.60 Such flexibility is clearly
of benefit to. employers as well as employees.
The introduction of German-style works councils into the Australian
industrial relations system could be achieved relatively easily within the
existing institutional infrastructure of the industrial relations commissions at· state and· federal.levels. These tribunals are well-equipped to
undertake the role of the German Labour Court in resolving intractable
disputes between works councils and employers where the councils have
the right of codetermination. In doing so they also often establish mini':"
mum general standards through test cases. The Australian tribunals have
long. experience. and considerable expertise in dealing with workplace
issues such as restructuring and even unfair dismissals, which would be
likely to.arise ifwe.adopted the German system. However, the attraction
of the German system is that its rationale is to encourage a consensus
approach to these workplace issues by dealing with them at the workplace level rather than through unions in a more adversarial framework.
The German Labour Court; therefore, is only a last resort applied in a
small minority . of cases which. represent a breakdown in. the system,
rather than its normal mode of operation.
Finally, the overseas experience suggests that training ofworks councilors is critical for their effective participation in enterprise governance.
Within,Australia this is already evident from the experience with JCCs,
and the substantial penetration of JCCs into Australian worlq)laces suggests that a solid base of skills development already exists in this area for
further expansion: There is also evidence that training for.representative
participation ,overlaps extensively with training requirements for. other
aspects of employees' jobs, notably teamwork, but also in more basic
areas such as literacy, numeracy, rudimentary accounting skills and meeting procedure.6I Employers, therefore, would be likely to benefit more
generally from further investment in this area.
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None ofthe major actors in Australian industrial relations at this stage
is committed to a legislative program for mandatory works councils: The
nationally ruling Liberal and National Parties have quite' fixed anti-legislative policies in this area. The' Labor Party (ALP) also stopped short
of supporting mandatory legislation when ·it· was ·last in power at a
national level, in 1983-96, althoughjt did support employee participation,' not least in the 1993 Act referrea to earlier. Even if the ALP had
introduced such legislation, it is unlikely to have passed: the Senate,
where it did not enjoy a majority. It is possibk that the ALP could support works councils in the future, as it has ata State level in New South
Wales' and South Australia previously in the 1970s. 62 k might expect
support in the Senate from the minor Democratic Party, which has a pol.:.
icy supporting means for the extension of employee participation, without specifically referring to legislation for mandatory works. councils~
However, if the ALP did form· government nationally in the future,·.it
could not rely on the Democrats holding the balance ofpower in the
Senate.
ALP policy would be dependent on the position of the other major
industrial relations parties. Neither employers nor unions have policies
supporting mandatory works councils. Employers have a long history of
opposing legislative interference with managerial prerogative, although
they have a substantial history of supporting voluntarist forms of employee participation such as JCCs. Unions also have a well-developed suspicion of non-union forms of employee·· participation ·as managerialist
manipulation of workers and as a means of undermining union loyalty.63
These fears were to some extent confirmed by the experience of the
1980s and 1990s referred to earlier. Nevertheless, there are signs of the
beginning of a shift in attitude in the unions since the Evatt Foundation's
report, Unions 2001. A small number of union leaders· have publicly
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suggested the positive potential of works councils, and the issue has
received growing support within the peak union ·body, the Australian
Council ofTrade Unions. 64
It is notoriously difficult to import industrial relations institutions
from'one country into another, and to expect the same positiveresults in
the new environment that may be apparent in the country of origin. The
same institution may'operate in an entirely different industrial relations
culture which leads to entirely different outcomes. As noted earlier, the
German system of works councils took a considerable time to develop the
acceptance and trust by employers, employees and their unions necessary
for its successful operation today. As a system it relies on a high degree
of consensus or integrative bargaining, but the Australian industrial relations culture has·. traditionally had a predominantly adversarial· basis.
These issues have been the subject of extensive debate in ·labour law literature.65
Nevertheless, there are clear indications of the potential for extensive
cultural shift in the Australian industrial relations system. Twenty-five
years ago, Professor John Niland (former president of the liRA) advocated enterprise-based collective bargaining as a replacement for the traditional Australian centralised .system of industrial relations based on
industry and occupational awards of arbitration tribunals. At the time this
seemed a utopian dream.i 'In 1985 the first general enquiry into the
Australian industrial relations system for 60 years strongly confirmed the
efficacy: of the centralised tribunal system. 66 Yet, within three years a
Liberal State government in NSW· began to prepare for the first loosening of the centralised system with an inquiry led by Niland.67 From 1990
Labor and Liberal governments successively·weakened the traditional
system in favour of an enterprise bargaining system, which today underpins the industrial. relations system. Who· could ·have predicted such
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major changes 20 years ago? Equally, who would have predicted that the
British industrial relations system would face the changes it does today
as a result ofEU legislation?
This argument, together with the international spread of works council structures, finds support in Poole et al.'s 'favourable conjunctures'
theoretical explanation for shifts in approach to employee participation,
with its emphasis on contingency and agency of the actors.68The first
main variables that Poole et al. identify in this framework, the macroconditions external to organisations, have considerable potential to exert
a major impact on Australian conditions through the combined processes of globalisation; EU legislation and efforts to improve corporate governance. The emphasis on workplace-level bargaining and efficiency in
the current Australian system certainly produces organisational structures and processes at the level of the firm which are conducive to representative participation. Recent strategic choices of employers and unions
also have clearly favoured the extension ofrepresentative participation
through JCCs, with all their limitations. The power of these actors, however, is insufficient to induce system-wide changes without legislative
support.
Supporters of a cyclical approach to explaining historical shifts in
employee participation practices69 would note that in the 1970s industrial democracy, and particularly works councils, were a focus for public
policy debate in Australia, as elsewhereJO Some initiatives were undertaken by business and governments offered a range of supportive measures short of compulsory legislation in this era, but this movement was
not sustained. What happened to these experiments at the enterprise
level? How successful were they, and why did they fail to spread more
widely? The answer to these questions is that we do not know. We do not
even know for sure that these experiments all failed. Indeed, there are
even earlier examples of attempts to introduce representative participation in the Whitley Industrial Councils from 1918 in NSW, about which
we know virtually nothingJI Similarly, no systematic studies have been
undertaken for the experience ofERBs in State-owned enterprises, which
spread throughout Australia during the 1970s. Furthermore, we lack a
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clear and systematic understanding of the operation of legislation at the
State level of jurisdiction that requires employee representation on occupational health and safety committees. A substantial record of activities
in these areas remains to be uncovered.
The first step, therefore, is to attempt to h!arn from our extensive historical experience in Australia by undertaking an extensive and systematic research agenda to discover the elements of success and failure in the
past.· However,. this. should also. be extended to the contemporary situation. Despite the broad contours of current practices which may be
gleaned from surveys,.much more detailed data is required to understand
the factors which have supported and hindered representative participation. Systematic data relating to employee representation on Australian
boards does not exist, nor is there a body of research literature examining the role and practices of ERB. More literature has been produced
concerning JCCs, but it remains limited. We need to know more about the
organisational and cultural environments in which works councils would
thrive, including possible regional variations within Australia. Apart from
surveys, this data will also need to be derived from an extensive program
of case studies to capture the complex tapestry of participation in different organisational settings ..
The second step, which might be taken simultaneously, is extensive
international case· study research· on examples of system transformation
towards representative participation. The British case offers a unique
opportunity in this regard as it moves towards compliance with EU legislation outlined earlier. It is particularly apposite because of some of the
institutional and behavioural aspects of industrialrelations it shares with
Australia. Other examples of transformation might also be taken from
central and eastern Europe.
Only after the major research agenda described here has commenced
can the formulation. of adequate public policy take place. This research
would provide the basis for the, adaptation of a German works council
model to Australian conditions, which would avoid the problems associated with simply trying to transplant institutions from different countries
and cultural environments. Furthermore, this research agenda would
itself contribute to the momentum for cultural change.

7.

CONCLUSIONS

European-style works councils and other forms of representative employee participation at the enterprise and workplace level have wide support
in a number of countries in Europe amongst both employers and unions.
There is considerable evidence that representative forms of participation
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help build employee commitment and cooperation; and facilitate 'hightrust, low-conflict relations' between management; workers and unions.
In addition, it is clear that representative participation :is also strongly
associated with effective forms of direct participation which are designed
to enhance productivity and efficiency outcomes in the workplace. At the
same time, the decline in union membership .in Australia has created a
major 'representation gap' which could be partially filled by an extensive
system of,workplace employee representation. The joint consultative
committees which have become common in Australian workplaces in
recent years have many drawbacks iri providing the systematic approach
to representative participation which is desirable. This is especially the
case because they have not spread beyond a substantial minority of workplaces, their genuine independence from management is often questionable, and their powers in relation to management are too limited to offer
a substantial employee voice in decision:..ffiaking. These trends indicate
the need and conditions for development of asystematic approach to representative participation in Australian workplaces as an important matter
of public policy..
The German style of works councils, operating in. a system of eodetermination defined by law, seems to offer particular advantages for
the Australian context. The intervention of the state in this way structures
an even-handedness which lies atthe heart ofthe German system, and
fosters the high degree of trust from employers and employees and
unions which is necessary for the success of'a system of this kind. In
order to build the support necessary from both parties,·it would be essential to maintain the clear separation of the works councils from both management ·and unions which characterises the German system.
The adoption of this system offers substantial advantages to employers, employees and unions in Australia, and the existing industrial relations tribunals have the necessary expertise to provide support.
Employers would clearly benefit from the·potential of works councils to
improve flexibility and productivity and facilitate direct participative
practices such as teamwork, in the workplace. The works council structure also tends to remove some of the main sources of employee resistance to workplace change. Wage considerations are removed from the
provenance of workplace change and flexibility in a centralised industry
level system of wage determination by collective bargaining with unions.
Employment security is one of the strongest areas of works council eodetermination power. These same factors offer much to employees and
unions. Nor would unions necessarily have much to fear from works
councils displacing their role and appeal to· members, since unionists.
tend to be elected to works councils in far greater proportion than their
general membership density. Indeed, the European experience reveals the
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potential for unions to develop strong partnership relations with works
councils which would enable unions to indirectly reach a much greater
proportion of the workforce than their own membership. The lessons
from Europe point to a genuine win-win outcome from the adoption of a
WQrks council system on the German model in Australia.
However, before systemic change is embarked upon, we need to
understand much more about the extensive Australian historical record in
this area and about current practices. We also need to learn from systemic
transformations occurring in Britain and central and eastern Europe. This
requires a major research effort, so that public policy choices are well
informed.
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